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Abstract
A model of incentive salience as a function of stimulus value and interoceptive state
has been previously proposed [1]. In that model, the function differs depending on
whether the stimulus is appetitive or aversive; it is multiplicative for appetitive stimuli
and additive for aversive stimuli. The authors argued it was necessary to capture data
on how extreme changes in salt appetite could move evaluation of an extreme salt
solution from negative to positive. We demonstrate that arbitrarily varying this
function is unnecessary, and that a multiplicative function is sufficient if one assumes
the incentive salience function for an incentive (such as salt) is comprised of multiple
stimulus features and multiple interoceptive signals. We show that it is also
unnecessary considering the dual-structure approach-aversive nature of the reward
system, which results in separate weighting of appetitive and aversive stimulus
features.
Introduction
Understanding the mechanisms involved in learning to respond to rewards and
punishments (reward learning) is a central question in psychology, neuroscience,
economics, and related fields. One major distinction that researchers have made is
between model-based and model-free responding [2, 3]. Model-based responding and
prediction assumes that the organism learns and uses mental representations or
models of the environment to make predictions and decisions. In contrast, model-free
responding assumes that the organism relies on cached estimates of the value of
actions and that its predictions are based on associative processes. These two types of
responding have very different implications for the nature of the representations and
the computational processes that characterize these two forms of responding.
A further classical distinction is between instrumental and Pavlovian responding.
In instrumental responding, an organism learns to make a response to achieve a goal
(e.g., get food), whereas in Pavlovian responding the organism acts based on learned
associations between the presence of a stimulus in the environment (CS) and the
occurrence of a reward (or punishment) (UCR). Researchers note that instrumental
responding can be either model-based or model-free. According to a model-based view
of instrumental learning and responding, the organism learns a model of the
environment and then when deciding how to respond, reasons over that model of the
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world before choosing a response. Whereas according to a model-free view of
instrumental learning and responding, the organism learns associations between
rewards and instrumental responses and responds automatically to the appearance of
a reward.
In contrast, [4] note that the typical view of Pavlovian responding is that it is
solely model-free, relying on cached estimates of the value of stimuli, and not on a
model of the environment. However, they argue that recent research (see [5, 6])
provides compelling evidence that Pavlovian predictions can rely on a form of
model-based prediction, as the organism can update its predictions and judgments on
the fly, based on its current interoceptive state. This work shows that changes in
interoceptive state can lead to changes in the incentive value of a Pavlovian CS,
without the necessity of the organism actually re-experiencing the reward (UCR),
suggesting the use of some form of internal model.
They note [4] that while there is extensive work on computational accounts of
model-based instrumental responding [7], an adequate computational account of
model-based Pavlovian responding is currently lacking. They note one possible
mathematical model [1] of such Pavlovian predictions and its sensitivity to
interoceptive state. Along with the authors of that model, they admit that the model
is somewhat unsatisfactory and they express the need for continuing work toward a
more adequate model. Here we present a more principled mathematical model.
Model-based responding and revaluation
The phenomenon of re-valuation (henceforth revaluation) is taken as a key test of
whether an animal’s behavior is model-free or model-based. If an animal can change
its evaluation of the attractiveness of a reward, without having to explicitly
re-experience the reward, then this is taken as evidence that they have an explicit
representation of the reward and decision-making is at least partially model-based.
For example, consider an instrumental learning task, where a rat learns to press a
lever for food: If the animal is subsequently fed to satiety, and when presented with
the lever now presses it less vigorously, this revaluation is taken as evidence that the
response is model-based and not model-free. The idea is that when the animal’s
internal state (hunger) changes, they can revalue the attractiveness of the food
without having to actually re taste the food reward. This is taken as evidence that the
animal has a sensory representation of the food and can use that to re evaluate the
attractiveness of the food, thus the response is model-based. On the other hand, if the
animal’s lever pressing is unaffected by the level of hunger of the animal, this is taken
as evidence of model-free responding.
Although most researchers have considered Pavlovian responding to be solely
model-free, Berridge and his colleagues [5, 6] provide compelling evidence that
Pavlovian responding can be model-based. They showed experimentally, in several
tests of Pavlovian conditioning and responding, that changes in interoceptive or bodily
state can shift the incentive salience (motivational value) for a CS from negative to
positive, without the organism having an opportunity to explicitly re-experience the
UCR. This strongly argues that the animal had an internal representation of the UCR
and was able to use that to re-evaluate the attractiveness of the UCR.
A 2009 study [6] examined the impact of changes in interoceptive state for salt
appetite on incentive salience. Experimenters measured ventral pallidum firing rates
(encoding reward value), when a rat was exposed to a CS that had been associated
with an extremely salty solution (hence the term Dead Sea Salt study). Firing rates
were compared across several successive conditions. First, rats in a normal sodium
state underwent Pavlovian conditioning. In one condition rats learned to associate a
CS with a very salty solution (UCR) (Dead Sea Salt). In another condition they
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learned to associate a different CS with a sucrose solution. In a third condition, the
CS didn’t predict anything. During training, only the CS for sucrose elicited high
levels of firing. On a following day a state of sodium depletion was induced to create a
salt appetite. Then the different CSs were presented multiple times in extinction (i.e.,
no presentation of the UCR). At that point, from the very first presentation of the CS
(i.e., without any re-tasting), the salt CS elicited a level of firing as high or higher
than the sucrose CS. This suggests that changes in interoceptive state (the induced
salt appetite) led to large changes in the incentive salience of the CS associated with
the extremely salty solution.
In a subsequent study [5], changes in interoceptive state for the extremely salty
solution also led to strong changes in approach versus aversive behavior to a lever
associated with the salt solution, as well as changes in gene expression related to the
Fos protein in reward related regions. In this experiment rats learned that different
levers (CSs) were associated with either extreme saltiness or sweetness. On some
trials, a lever accompanied by a distinctive sound was inserted through the wall of the
chamber, accompanied by a squirt of a disgusting salt solution. On other trials, on the
opposite side of the chamber, a lever was inserted with a different distinctive sound
accompanied by a squirt of sweet sucrose solution. The rats approached and nibbled
the sucrose associated lever, but actively avoided the extreme salt solution associated
lever. On a subsequent day the rats were injected with two drugs that mimicked the
effects of two hormones that are normally associated with salt appetite (which they
had never previously encountered). Now the salt associated lever became highly
attractive and received approach activity close to the level of the sucrose lever, whose
attractiveness was unaffected. Further, expression of Fos proteins in reward related
regions of the brain (core and rostral shell of the nucleus accumbens, as well as the
ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the rostral ventral pallidum and infralimbic and
orbitofrontal regions of the prefrontal cortex) was “dramatically upregulated by the
combination of (a) reencountering the CS+ lever simultaneously with (b) being in the
new appetite state” [5].
These two studies [5, 6] taken together provide strong evidence that the rats were
able to re evaluate the CS, without having to re experience the UCR. This strongly
argues that the rats had a representation or model of the UCR and that this model
guided their response to the CS, supporting the idea that Pavlovian learning can be
model-based.
[1] sought to develop a mathematical model of the effects of interoceptive state on
incentive salience in these experiments. Berridge [1,5,8] had originally argued that the
impact of interoceptive state on Wanting could be captured by a multiplicative
function of interoceptive state and cue strength. This is the incentive salience or
motivational value of a stimulus.
A simple multiplicative equation in [1] describes incentive salience or motivational
value of the current CS in terms of κ, representing the level of bodily state, and r,
representing reward value:
r˜(rt, κ) = κrt (1)
This multiplicative model captured the pattern of results in situations in which
revaluation of the moderate solution results in a shift from somewhat positive (or
neutral) to more positive or vice versa. However, the same shift did not occur for the
Dead Sea Salt solution, in which revaluation leads to a shift from highly negative to
somewhat positive. Applying a multiplicative model in the extremely salty, Dead Sea
Salt condition predicted that changes in interoceptive state would lead to a reversal in
preference ordering: rats would move from preferring the higher-salt, Dead Sea Salt
solution to the moderate-salt solution. However, the data showed a maintenance in
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preference ordering as the valuation shifted with interoceptive state. Contrary to the
preference predicted in Eq. 1, in a salt-depleted condition, rats still preferred the
moderate-salt solution to the strong-salt solution. To capture the pattern for aversive
cues, they suggested an additive function that added the log of κ, which maintains the
preference ordering:
r˜(rt, κ) = rt + logκ (2)
Thus, in their account [1] shifting among positive evaluations is modeled by a
multiplicative function, whereas shifting from negative to positive is modeled by an
additive function. They and [4] implied that this was somewhat inelegant. However,
neither [1] nor [4] provided an alternative model. The problem of accounting for all
the data here in a single model we describe as the non-monotonicity problem.
A parsimonious multi-attribute model
Here we propose a single mathematical model, using just a multiplicative function,
that can be used to capture both types of revaluation and solve the non-monotonicity
problem. There are four key hypotheses of the models presented, outline below. These
are simulated retasting, multiple attributes to a stimulus, potentially separable
interoceptive responses that are relevant to different attributes, and a dual-track
appetitive-aversive system. However, for our proposal below to explain the [1] data,
one must only accept Hypothesis 1 and either Hypothesis 2-3 or Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 2-3 are included because they are plausible, given the multifaceted nature
of biological feedback systems, and could explain a wide variety of behavior beyond
the simple example presented here. Hypothesis 4 is included because it fits with an
overwhelming amount of neuroanatomical data [9–11]. We hold that all are likely true.
Hypothesis 1. Consistent with [1, 4–6], after initial training the organism has
associated the CS with a sensory representation of the UCR (e.g, the Dead Sea Salt
solution) and when it is faced with a decision in a new interoceptive state, it can
reactivate that representation and use the representation to reevaluate it. That is, in
the Dead Sea Salt studies the rat can ‘imaginarily retaste’ the solution, or simulate
tasting the solution, when it receives the appropriate CS. Parallels could be drawn
between this process and those outlined in the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, in which
the brain learns an ‘as if’ body loop [12, 13] that can simulate interoceptive signals
using top-down processes.
Hypothesis 2. For any given stimulus, there may be multiple sensory associations, or
attributes. The different attributes can be separately represented in the learned
sensory representation. For example, the rat may represent a salty solution both
positively as potential for fulfilling a need for salt, and negatively as potential for
hypernatremia (i.e., blood salt concentration reaching unhealthily high levels).
Moderate solutions may only be weakly associated with hypernatremia but strongly
associated with fulfilling a need for salt, while both solutions could be strongly
associated with fulfilling salt need. Alternatively, we might posit need for both sodium
and hydration. In this case, both solutions work to fulfill sodium need, but decrease
perceived hydration level. If the moderate solution is only weakly associated with a
decrease in hydration, but the strong solution is strongly associated with it, then there
could also be a non-linear relationship between salt content and preference. A third
plausible interpretation may be an evolved instinctual aversion to strong salt taste–a
disgust response–existing simultaneously with a taste (learned or innate) for salt
consumption.
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Hypothesis 3. There are potentially different interoceptive states associated with
each of the stimulus attributes. Interoceptive states will moderate the incentive
salience or motivational value of attributes that are relevant to that interoceptive
state, but will not impact the value of unrelated attributes. This suggests that the
overall Wanting or lack of Wanting might be the sum of a multiplicative function of
current interoceptive state(s) times the separate valuation of attributes relevant to the
interoceptive state. That is, there are potentially separate terms for each interoceptive
state and its relevant attributes and overall Wanting is the sum of those terms.
Hypothesis 4. Evaluation of the stimulus (e.g., the salt solution) takes place in two
independent systems, an Approach or Appetitive system, and an Avoidance or
Aversive system. There is considerable evidence for these two distinct systems and for
the idea that the appetitive and aversive aspects of a stimulus are evaluated
independently in two separate systems [9–11]. For example, in the Dead Sea Salt
studies [1], an appetitive desire for salt (to ensure the body doesn’t reach
hyponatremia, or unhealthily low salt levels) would be evaluated by the Appetitive
system, while an aversive drive to avoid salt (to avoid hypernatreia) would be
evaluated in the Aversive system.
For example, assume that in the Dead Sea Salt study [1], the appetitive system
represents the potential of each salt solution for salt satiation, while the aversive
system represents its potential for salt hypernatremia. In the animal’s normal state,
the interoceptive state or salt need will be modest, the resulting weight will be small,
and as a result the incentive salience for the saltiness will be low. Thus, it will have
little effect on positive valuation of either the moderate or strong solution, while the
extreme aversiveness of the strong solution will lead to a strong negative weight, and a
strong negative valuation in the Aversive system. When the rat is salt depleted, its
interoceptive state or Need for salt goes up dramatically. The result is that the
multiplicative weight on “saltiness” goes up strongly for the salt depleted rat and the
incentive salience of the “saltiness” will go up dramatically. Both solutions will
become more appetitive. However, there remains an aversive association between the
strong solution and hypernatremia. Thus, although the moderate solution remains
attractive, the reaction to the strong solution’s net value will be conflicted, more
balanced by appetitive and aversive urges, and thus the strong solution will not be as
appetitive as the moderate solution (in fact, the strong solution may remain aversive).
As a result, the overall valuation of both salt solutions becomes more positive, but the
moderate solution may remain the more appetitive one.
Model 1: Minimal
Here we first present a minimal model. The minimal model has only those features
necessary to demonstrate how a multi-attribute model solves the non-monotonicity
problem in [1]. Later, we explore how that model could be modified and extended to
model separate appetitive and aversive drives.
This model is presented in its full form online (see the Supporting Information S1),
along with an interactive widget allowing readers to modify code and see the model’s
impact with arbitrary values.
Model objectives
This minimal example sets out to solve the following model objectives:
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Objective 1. Under at least weak to moderate salt depletion, the rat prefers the
moderate solution to the strong solution; it may approach the strong solution
sometimes, but less often than the moderate solution.
Objective 2. Under salt satiation, the rat prefers the moderate solution to the strong
solution (i.e., finds it less aversive).
Objective 3. Under sufficiently strong salt depletion, the strong solution can become
appetitive while still being less appetitive than the moderate solution.
Objective 4. The rat’s choice of the moderate or salty solution will be a function of
the relative incentive salience or ”wanting” of the two solutions, where incentive
salience is a function of cue strength for the two solutions. Thus, under salt depletion,
the rat will take the strong solution if there is no cue for the moderate solution.
Objective 5. Appetitive states work in parallel, so a neural response to the sugar
solution is unaffected by changes in interoceptive states unrelated to sugar. Thus,
when there are both a salt solution and a sugar solution, and a need for salt and sugar,
a region representing a wanting signal will fire for the salt solution, as well as for the
sugar solution. The two alternatives compete. When there is not a need for salt, the
wanting signal for sugar will fire regardless, while the wanting signal for salt will
not [6].
Objectives 1 and 2: multiple stimulus features
Following and extending terminology in [1], we can specify the basic mathematical
model that satisfies the first two objectives:
r˜(r, κ) = κNarNa + κhrh (3)
κ values represent interoceptive drive, while r represents expected reward. Subscripts
denote the particular drive (for κ) or reward (for r) associated with each term: Na for
salt, and h for hydration level. The total reward associated with a particular action is
the expected outcome (r) associated with that action across all of the drives.
We can recast Eq. 3 as a set of κ values and r vectors representing the drive and
reward values of each alternative
r˜(r, κ) =κNarNa + κhrh (4)
Each r is a column vector of values for each solution,
[
Moderate Na solution
Strong Na solution
]
We can then calculate the desire for salt and the predicted action under conditions of
either salt deprivation (κNa = 1) or salt satiation (κNa = 0). Two need states are
posited - a ‘salt need’ and a ‘hypernatremia avoidance need’. We assume that a
moderately salty solution isn’t associated with hypernatremia, while a strongly salty
solution is associated with hypernatremia. The expected value for a moderately salty
solution, rNa, is 0.5 while for the strong solution it is 1.0. The expected value for
hypernatremia rh, is 0.0 for the moderately salty drink but -2.0 for the strongly salty
solution. Then, when interoceptive drive state for salt is κNa is 1.0, the moderately
salty solution will be preferred. When it is −1.0, i.e., an aversion to salt due to
oversatiation, the moderately salty solution will still be preferred, while the strongly
salty solution will be even less preferred.
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Thus, we can calculate the expected reward for each alternative, given present
interoceptive signals, under salt deprivation:
r˜(r, κ) =κNarNa + κhrh (5)
=1×
[
0.5
1.0
]
+ 2×
[
0.0
−1.0
]
=
[
0.5
−1.0
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
indicating a drive for the moderate solution but not the strong solution. We can
combine this with a softmax function [14]
Pt(a) =
exp(r˜a/τ)∑n
i=1 exp(r˜t(i)/τ)
, (6)
in order to make the decision probabilistic. This way, either action has some
probability of being performed but the higher the r˜ value, the higher probability the
action will be performed. Thus, in this instance, there is a higher probability of
drinking the moderate salt solution than the strong salt solution, but both choices are
possible; the relative likelihood is set by the temperature τ .
Under salt over-satiation:
r˜(r, κ) =κNarNa + κhrh (7)
=− 1×
[
0.5
1.0
]
+ 2×
[
0.0
−1.0
]
=
[
−0.5
−3.0
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
indicating an aversive drive away from the moderate solution, but an even stronger
drive away from the strong solution.
Under the conditions assumed here, we meet Objectives 1-2 above.
Objective 3
In the previous section we demonstrated meeting Objectives 1-2. But notice that the
expected value estimated for the strong solution is always negative, and we can expect
the rat will not drink the salt solution, even if it is the only solution available. To
meet Objective 3 above–to show the strong salt solution can become weakly appetitive
under the right conditions–we first need to assume a different weighting of
hypernatremia to deprivation. For instance, we can do that by increasing the
deprivation/interoceptive state value κNa from 1 to 3.
Results
In that greater deprived state,
r˜(r, κ) =κNarNa + κhrh (8)
=3×
[
0.5
1.0
]
+ 2×
[
0.0
−1.0
]
=
[
1.5
1.0
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
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and the strong solution now has positive value, though still less than the moderate
solution. Note that with a sufficiently strong weighting towards salt need, the model
would actually predict a reference for the stronger solution; this is discussed further
below. The preference for the moderate solution is still greater than that for the
strong solution. Importantly, if there was no moderate solution then the positive
expected value for the strong solution would lead to drinking the strong solution.
Objective 4: Environmental cues
Now, in order to make explicit the role of environmental cues in generating incentive
salience we need to introduce an extra vector describing environmental cues that cue
reward objects, c. Following the S-R-O expectancy valence account given in [1], the
extra parameter describes environmental features eliciting a response.
In this model, a response is only taken if the environment elicits it. ‘Elicitation’
refers to a cue prompting a response by an organism. We extend [1], in which the
product of the environmental cue strength and interoceptive urge is a measure of the
strength of incentive salience, ‘Wanting’, or reward prediction value. The multiple
factors introduced in the previous section allow us to consistently express this as a
multiplicative function rather than switch between multiplicative and additive
functions, as in [1].
Internal cues could also potentially be represented using c, although we have not
needed to model that process for our current purposes. For instance, processes such as
default-mode network mind-wandering, or other top-down processes including
controlled processing, may draw attention to a particular stimulus, and combined with
an extant need, may thereby prompt an organism to seek the reward.
Results
Using the new model with our vector representing environmental cues c, we can
predict behavior where there is no cue for a moderate salt solution1:
r˜(r, κ) =κNarNac+ κhrhc (9)
=3×
[
0.5
1.0
]
◦
[
0.0
1.0
]
+ 2×
[
0.0
−1.0
]
◦
[
0.0
1.0
]
=
[
0.0
1.0
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
The result is that the expected value for the strong solution is 1.0 while the
expected value for the moderate solution is 0.0 (because it simply hasn’t been cued or
elicited). The strong solution becomes the preferred solution, without salt depletion
increasing, thanks to the lack of availability of the moderate solution as an alternative.
Cue should generally have a lower-bound of 0, and and for some applications it
may be suitable to give cue an upper-bound of 1. For the current application, setting
a particular upper-bound is not particularly important.
Cue c models the mental accessibility of the stimulus as a whole rather than the
accessibility of particular stimulus aspects. Therefore, it is also normally expected to
be equal across all needs modeled. Thus, c appears without any subscript in Eq. 9.
1Note the use of elementwise multiplication between the matrices using the symbol ◦
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Objective 5: Sugar
The model in Eq. 4 can be extended slightly to account for the evidence discussed in
the sugar example in [6], where the neural response to a sugar solution was unaffected
by changes in interoceptive states unrelated to the sugar:
r˜(r, κ) = κNarNa + κhrh + κGlcrGlc (10)
With this simple model, we can account for the effect described in [1] and in [6].
Results
If r˜(r, κ) represents reward value, then we can very simply show how this might work
using our new Eq. 10:
r˜(r, κ) =κNarNa + κhrh + κGlcrGlc
=κNa ×

0.51.0
0.0

+ κh ×

 0.0−1.0
0.0

+ 1×

0.00.0
1.0


=

0.5κNa1.0κNa
0.0

+

 0.0−1.0κh
0.0

+

0.00.0
1.0


=

 0.5κNa1.0κNa − 1.0κh
1.0

Moderate Salt solutionStrong Salt solution
Sugar solution
(11)
In this model, while the reward value for the moderate and strong salty solutions
will vary according to the current interoceptive craving for salt (κNa) and hydration
(κh), the desire for glucose will remain constant so long as the interoceptive craving for
sugar does not change.
Combined model
Finally, we assume that cue strength will be a relevant factor for the sugar reward
seeking, relative to salt reward seeking, so we extend the model further by adding a
cue strength multiplier as described in Eq. 9:
r˜(r, κ) =κNarNac+ κhrhc+ κGlcrGlcc (12)
Model 2: Appetitive and aversive drives
There is overwhelming evidence for separate neurological pathways for appetitive and
aversive drives, and as a result, appetitive and aversive cues are separately evaluated
in the two systems [9–11]. Here we present a model that explicitly represents those
two different systems.
Design
We can modify Eq. 9 to calculate separate appetitive and aversive drives. To model
Objectives 1-4 (the salt models, though not the sugar model) this time, we assume the
same salt need and hypernatremia avoidance drive, but model the hypernatremia
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pathway as inherently aversive. We use the subscripts Na+ and Na− to distinguish
sodium need (the appetitive drive) and hypernatremia danger (the aversive drive) in
these instances.
r˜(r, κ) =κNa+rNa+c− λ(κNa−rNa−c) (13)
Here, λ represents a loss aversion parameter and describes how aversive losses are
compared to gains. From a purely behavioral modeling perspective, λ is not necessary
because it simply represents a weight to the general interoceptive effect of aversive r
relative to appetitive r. However, theoretical and empirical research has established
the phenomenon of loss aversion [15, 16], in which a loss is more aversive than an
equally sized gain. Neurobiologically, there appears to be separable circuitry for
reward and punishment [17,18]. Specifically, excitatory, approach action is driven by a
direct, striatal dopaminergic pathway, while aversive action is driven through other
means, including an indirect inhibitory dopaminergic pathway. Thus, we can expect
the relative strength of those two systems could affect the relative strength of all
aversive and appetitive attributes in a model. Thus, a value like λ which captures that
relative strength is conceptually useful when linking the model in Eq. 13 to its
neurobiological correlates.
Results
The next few equations work out how each of the four objectives above can be
described using this model. To meet Objective 1, we assume that the moderate salt
solution is preferred to the strong solution because hypernatremia risk is lower, even
though it provides less salt satiation. We assume loss aversion λ = 2:
r˜(r, κ) =κNa+rNa+c− λ(κNa−rNa−c) (14)
=1×
[
1.0
2.0
]
◦
[
1.0
1.0
]
− 2× 2×
[
0.1
1.0
]
◦
[
1.0
1.0
]
=
[
0.6
−2.0
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
We can show that the rat will naturally also prefer the moderate solution under
salt satiation (Objective 2), though both are at least slightly aversive:
r˜(r, κ) =κNa+rNa+c− λ(κNa−rNa−c) (15)
=0.1×
[
1.0
2.0
]
◦
[
1.0
1.0
]
− 2× 2×
[
0.1
1.0
]
◦
[
1.0
1.0
]
=
[
0.1
0.2
]
−
[
0.4
4.0
]
=
[
−0.3
−3.8
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
Further, under sufficiently strong salt depletion there may be some desire for the
stronger solution (Objective 3):
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r˜(r, κ) =κNa+rNa+c− λ(κNa−rNa−c) (16)
=3×
[
1.0
2.0
]
◦
[
1.0
1.0
]
− 2× 2×
[
0.1
1.0
]
◦
[
1.0
1.0
]
=
[
3
6
]
−
[
0.4
4
]
=
[
2.6
2
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
Finally, we can show that, under salt depletion, the rat will take the strong salt
solution if it has no other option (Objective 4):
r˜(r, κ) =κNa+rNa+c− λ(κNa−rNa−c) (17)
=3×
[
1.0
2.0
]
◦
[
0.0
1.0
]
− 2× 2×
[
0.1
1.0
]
◦
[
0.0
1.0
]
=
[
0
6
]
−
[
0
4
]
=
[
0
4
]
Moderate Salt solution
Strong Salt solution
Discussion
Our model is inspired by the possibility that in the normal ecology of an organism,
such as a rat or a human, there will be multiple possible stimuli to which the organism
can respond (Hypothesis 2) (e.g, water, food, conspecific, possible mate) and there will
be related multiple potential interoceptive states (Hypothesis 3). In our earlier
work [19] (see also [20–22]) we have argued that decision-making will be the result of a
competitive process among currently activated motives, where the strength of the
motive activation or Wanting is a multiplicative function of the relevant interoceptive
state and the strength of the relevant cue. Thus, any decision or choice is going to
depend on the relative (and not the absolute) strength of alternative motives.
Moreover, this strongly suggests that in real ecologies one needs to consider all the
relevant possibilities and cannot focus on just one stimulus or motive.
A key assumption in our model, following [1, 4], is that during Pavlovian learning
the organism develops a sensory representation of the reward and that it can use that
representation to simulate the ”retasting” or re experiencing of the reward. Given that
assumption there are two separate mutually consistent pathways proposed here by
which the data regarding salt revaluation [1, 6] may be explained. The first is that
described in the previous paragraph: multiple stimulus attributes are combined with
multiple interoceptive states to produce a more complex overall evaluation of a
Pavlovian stimulus. The second is that appetitive and aversive stimuli are processed
separately, and so when a stimulus contains both appetitive and aversive elements
(e.g., a salt solution), the overall balance or predicted reward or incentive salience may
depend on the strength of the relative appetitive and aversive elements. We have
described both here as each independently can explain the salt revaluation data.
However, we argue that both are actually utilized by the brain for Pavlovian responses
to stimuli in the real world.
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Limitations
The models presented in this article describe how, even under a salt deprivation
condition, an organism will prefer a moderately salty to a strongly salty solution.
However, for all the models presented, once Salt Need is sufficiently strong, the strong
solution will be preferred to the moderate one, a preference reversal not apparent in
the observed data. We believe the model is not necessarily weakened by this
possibility, because there are undoubtedly physiological upper limits to the values that
salt need might take: the values that would lead to this preference reversal are likely
outside the bounds of a viable biological system. The model still demonstrates
parsimoniously how a moderately salty solution may be preferred to a strongly salty
solution, under both aversive and appetitive states.
Links to other work
The model presented here helps to tie together a number of separate lines of research.
Aside from [19–21], the Cues-Tendencies-Action personality model [22] is another that
exemplifies how competing cues and drives can inspire different actions. The
exploration of model-based Pavlovian associations has enabled us to draw links in the
current article from personality-based models [19, 22], designed primarily to model
model-based, instrumental activity, to models of Pavlovian activity such as the one
presented in this article.
This function r˜(r, κ) could be a candidate for an explicit mathematical definition
for the drive function d(h) in [20, 21]. d(h) in [20] describes the relative drive
associated with a stimulus, and similarly to our presentation, can describe multiple
drives and their interactions with one another, based on their distance in
multi-dimensional space from a neutral set-point. It is roughly analogous to κ in this
paper. However, [20, 21] have not explained how their drive framework can be used to
calculate a value for d(h) or r˜ (which has a similar meaning in their framework as
here) and thus have not specified how it provides a solution for the non-monotonicity
problem [1]. The model proposed in this paper demonstrates how that link might work
by describing how the the multiplicative cue-interoception function described by [1]
might produce that drive. Our model is neutral on whether the function measures
distance from a homeostatic ‘set point’ or whether it measures allostasis and a
distance from an allostatic equilibrium. In this way, the model here may be regarded
as an integrative proposal combining key elements of [20] and [1] to parsimoniously
address the additive/multiplicative dilemma in [1].
The OpAL model [23] also goes some of the way toward addressing the
non-monotonicity problem [1, 4]. The OpAL model argues that in making choices an
organism will separately weight the evaluations in two systems, a Go and a NoGo
system, similarly to the ‘Model 2’ Appetitive and Aversive system that we describe
here. This is consistent with a key assumption we make. However, their weighting
parameters, βG and βN , describe overall DA level, not specific interoceptive states. βG
and βN cannot vary in response to salt depletion and salt satiation in particular
without affecting other states, but would yield a re-weighting of all positive (and
negative) attributes. In contrast, prior research [6] suggests modification of salt
appetite has had no affect on rats’ sugar consumption-related behavior. Thus, the
OpAL model [23] is not on its own a plausible solution in the context of a model-based
Pavlovian learning system such as the one posited in [1]. In contrast, we propose that
interoceptive state, which can be specific to a particular attribute of a reward, can
lead to attribute specific re-weighting. Thus, our approach argues that re evaluative
re-weighting will be specific to the current interoceptive state or Need of the organism
(e.g., hunger versus thirst versus affiliation), whereas the OpAL model would suggest
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it is globally moderated by tonic dopamine levels.
Future directions
The models presented in the present work demonstrate how the salt revaluation
data [1] may be explained using a multi-attribute Pavlovian valuation model. Such a
model can of course explain a much broader array of phenomena–any instance in
which a Pavlovian stimulus may contain both appetitive and aversive associations, or
even any instance where there are multiple stimulus attributes that vary at least
somewhat independently. A simple extension might parallel our previous work [19],
demonstrating how the model extends to an arbitrary set of approach and avoid
motivations.
We have also not described the process of reward and punishment update learning
in the multi-attribute context. However, this would be a relatively straightforward
extension from the model presented here.
Conclusion
As previously noted [4], a variety of studies have shown that, contrary to earlier
assumptions that Pavlovian responding was solely model-free, that Pavlovian
responding can often be model-based, based on the simulated re evaluation of a
representation of a potential reward (or threat). Several of the most compelling
examples of this process were the series of studies we described involving responses to
extremely strong salt solutions [1, 5, 6].
Unfortunately, existing computational accounts of this process were not really
adequate. For example, the previous mathematical account of this process by Zhang
and his colleagues involved a multiplicative function for positive evaluation and an
additive function for negative evaluation. Here we have shown how this process can be
explained more parsimoniously with a single multiplicative function. This is done by
positing either (a) multiple stimulus attributes of a reward (or punishment) and
multiple interoceptive responses relevant to different attributes, or (b) separate
appetitive and aversive motivational pathways. It is likely that both sets of
assumptions are true. The present model provides a more adequate account of
Pavlovian, model-based evaluations than has been provided by previous work [1].
Supporting information
S1 Supplementary Online Materials. Viewing and running the model
online. At the time of publication, the models described here, including python code
to generate them, can be viewed in a Juypter Notebook posted on the github
repository website at
https://github.com/bjsmith/motivation-simulation/blob/master/minimal-example.ipynb.
From that page, readers can launch an interactive tool using the python
implementation to explore the model’s behavior with any arbitrary set of values.
Readers can also download the model, with the demo page, from the github
repository to examine or use in their own environment.
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